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Resumo: Este artigo pressupõe a dissolução da União 
Europeia. Não obstante as muitas teorias da integração 
europeia, há uma notável falta de teorias da sua 
desintegração. Inspirado por um filme recente, este 
artigo discute o debate público emergente em torno 
da crise da UE. Defende que, no caso de uma eventual 
e lenta desintegração da UE, não devemos prever um 
regresso à soberania anterior dos Estados-nação, mas 
um reforço das redes de cidades globais. Essa visão 
alternativa tem suas raízes nos diferentes campos da 
geografia política e da sociologia da comunicação e 
da tradição do federalismo municipal.
Palavras-chave: União Europeia, Desintegração, 
Federalismo, Municipalismo, Cidades globais, Redes
Abstract: This paper imagines the dissolution of the 
European Union. Notwithstanding the many theories 
of European integration, there is a conspicuous lack 
1 Possui doutorado em Ph.D. pela Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza 
(2001).
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of theories of its disintegration. Inspired by a recent 
film,  this  paper discusses the emerging public debate 
surrounding the crisis of the EU. It argues that, in the 
case of a possible, slow disintegration of the EU, we 
ought not to envision a return to the prior sovereignty 
of the nation states, but rather a strengthening of the 
networks of global cities. This alternative vision draws 
its roots from the different fields of political geography 
and the sociology of communication, and from the 
tradition of municipal federalism.
Keywords :  European Union, Disintegration, 
Federalism, Municipalism, Global Cities, Networks
I. The symptoms of a possible EU dissolution
As a project for the construction of a supranational 
institutional order, the European Union was animated from 
the outset by the telos of integration. From its original aim 
of resolving the conflict between France and Germany, to 
the more recent goals of establishing a single market and 
shared institutions for an expansive community of states, 
the EU has always sought integration. Even in our common 
speech, the expression “European integration” took form in 
the second half of the twentieth century as an inseparable 
binomial. Disciplines ranging from economic theory, to 
international relations and constitutional theory have all 
conceived of European integration as a project for the 
unification of markets, constitutions and legal systems. At 
the turn of the millennium, the attempt to provide the EU 
with a constitutional treaty signaled the promise in taking 
the path leading away from the classical internationalist 
and intergovernmental logic towards a more constitutional 
system instead. However, the failure of the constitutional 
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project of 2005 did not produce a retreat to the status quo 
ante, but rather the onset of a much deeper crisis. The late 
twentieth century had seen the relatively tame political and 
cultural rivalry between Eurosceptics and Europtimists. 
The end of the constitutionalization process, by contrast, 
has been followed by the devastating economic crisis of 
2008, the tension with Greece (both victim and executioner 
of the EU), the return of an anti-European politics in many 
national public spheres, the concrete possibility of a Brexit, 
the explosion of international conflicts like those triggered 
by the Arab Spring and  the escalation of tensions in Syria, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, the intensification of massive and 
uncontrollable migratory movements, the strengthening 
of ISIS with terrorist attacks on European soil and a newly 
aggressive Russia.
Instead of taking their cues from the immanent danger 
of a new European catastrophe, our political leaders have 
holed up in their national spheres, hoping to bring us back 
to a nineteenth century economy, law and international 
relations. The current crisis facing European integration is 
not its first one, but it is its most serious. We are beginning 
to fear that, for the first time in our history, the process of 
European integration has reached an impasse at best, and 
may even be shifting quickly into reverse. Some observers 
are starting to speak openly about Greek tragedy, de-
constitutionalization and, yes, disintegration.
The argument that I am putting forward is that the vast 
body of theory on European constitutional integration does 
not fathom the possibility of an end to integration, followed 
by the dissolution and breakdown of the institutions that 
have been gradually built up over the last 50 years. I belong 
to a generation steeped in Europeanist rhetoric and ideology. 
We are coming to realize for the first time that the great 
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project of our parents’ generation may have failed. As a 
European federalist and Italian comparativist, I think that we 
can view the current crisis as a generational one; the founding 
mothers and fathers of post-war Italy and Europe  are all 
dead. And Europeans of today find ourselves in what we 
could call a “Jeffersonian moment,” in which we rightfully 
question our allegiance to constitutional rules, whether 
national or supranational, made by the dead.
Convinced of the need to revitalize the European 
constitutional and federal project, I will examine the claim 
that the current political condition foretells a new European 
catastrophe. Looking ahead, I can imagine three possible 
future scenarios. In the first one, the current stagnation 
continues, while the elites go on as if nothing is wrong. Call 
it the Titanic scenario. A second possibility is that there could 
be a sudden and violent collapse, in which EU institutions are 
overwhelmed by the intensification of internal and external 
pressures. We can call it the Apocalypse Now scenario. Finally, 
we can imagine a future in which European institutions carry 
on, buoyed by resilient national institutions and European 
bureaucrats, but are unable to stop a slow dissolution and 
a shifting of power from the current center in Brussels-
Strasbourg towards a plurality of networks energized by 
the global cities of Europe. Call it the Metropolis scenario.
II. The Great European Disaster: just a film?
Before looking at the political writers now starting 
to dwell on disintegrative processes, I will discuss the 
apocalyptic scenario put forward in the excellent 2015 film, 
The Great European Disaster Movie. This film was directed by 
Annalisa Piras and produced by Bill Emmott, former editor 
of The Economist. Sometimes the visual and literary arts are 
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better attuned to social transformations than the analyses 
of experts and academics, who may be more motivated by 
logics of power and belonging than by a responsibility to 
warn us of a catastrophe that risks sweeping everything 
away.
The film revolves around an imaginary future dialogue 
between and Italian girl and an English architect, on board 
a flight to Berlin: the archeologist is heading to a conference 
where he will tell the Germans what the European Union 
was, and why it failed. The film foresees a Russian attack 
against the Ukraine, the triumph of the English anti-
European Nigel Farange in the European elections (both of 
which indeed happened), the victory of Marine Le Pen in the 
French presidential elections, and the consequent declaration 
of a state of emergency (proclaimed instead on 14 November 
2015 by the Valls government, followed two days later by 
President Hollande’s speech asking Parliament to amend 
Articles 16 and 36 of the constitution). The film also envisions 
an intensification of attacks by ISIS on European soil and the 
rise of anti-European political parties in Greece, Spain and 
Italy, leading to the abolition of the Euro in 2020, and then 
the European Council’s declaration of the abolition of the 
European Union itself.
This apocalyptic scenario, anything but unrealistic 
(it lacks only a vision of the Orbanization of Hungary and 
Poland unfolding in Eastern Europe), aims to provoke 
a debate around the question of whether Europe is 
sleepwalking towards disaster. The perfect storm, shocking 
the political, economic, social and constitutional structures of 
European societies, has in fact paralyzed the European ruling 
classes. The film presents the implosion of the European 
Union as the result of the failure of European institutions 
and leadership. The lack of charismatic politicians at the 
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European level appears as the deliberate choice of national 
political élites, afraid of the competition threatened by the 
emergence of viable European leaders.
The filmmakers agree with the economic analysis 
advanced by Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece: the 
massive tax evasion in Europe, together with the bailouts 
that only benefited British, French and German banks, have 
definitively undermined any collective belief in a European 
solidarity. They have instead pitted northern and southern 
Europeans against each other in a potentially lethal war 
between the poor. The filmmakers agree with Comte that 
demography is destiny, and that Europe needs immigration 
in the long run to regenerate an aging population. But they 
observe that almost every European country has responded 
to migration in a regrettably nationalistic way. They call for 
a Merkel Plan instead. Inspired by the post-war Marshall 
Plan, they would like to see the hegemonic power  in 
Europe provide aid to the other Member States of the EU. 
They also note how the most  recent European elections in 
2014 manifested a strong generational divide: in the face of 
an overall voter participation of 43%, 51% of persons over 
the age of 55 participated, compared to only 28% of those 
between 18 and 24.
According to the English archeologist, the European 
Union had two great problems: a generational one and a 
democratic one. The first refers to the growing gap between 
the younger generations and the European institutions 
they perceive as foreign, if not actually hostile. The second 
regards the eternal democratic deficit, metastasized from 
a problem of political and constitutional theory into a 
dramatically concrete political one. Given the impossibility 
of institutionalizing political responsibility, to shed light 
on those determining European public policy, and the 
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consequent lack of procedures for replacing one government 
with another one, the only alternative to unsatisfactory 
European institutions was the dissolution of the European 
Union itself.
In the film, the plane has to be redirected, first to 
Amsterdam, then to Paris, and finally to Glasgow. This sets 
off a collective anxiety about passport validity and entry 
visas, highlighting one of the first problems that a return 
to a Europe divided into many (pseudo) sovereign statelets 
would bring. In a final warning, the plane starts a descent 
that suggests its immanent crash.
III. The political theory of the disintegration of 
the EU
The vision of the dissolution of the European Union 
is not only the fantasy of cinematographic fiction, but has 
also been hypothesized by the investor George Soros
2 and 
the political scientist Jan Zielonka. Zielonka has proposed 
dissociating the process of European integration from its 
consolidation in supranational European institutions: “the 
EU  in this moment does not favor integration, but rather 
impedes it. I therefore propose a radically different idea 
of European integration, with less EU or without the EU 
altogether”
3
. According to Zielonka, everything points to an 
2 G.Soros, The Tragedy of the European Union: Disintegration or Revival?, 
New York, 2014, p.19: “the prospect is  for long-lasting stagnation. That 
is my main concern and worry. Europe, which is in many ways the most 
developed part of the world – and the biggest influence on the rest of the 
world as the cradle of our global  civilization – is in a state of economic and 
political disintegration”.
3 J. Zielonka, Is the EU Doomed?, Polity, 2014. Italian Translation: 
Disintegrazione. Come salvare l’Europa dall’Unione europea, Bari, 2015, 
XII.
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institutional collapse of the Union. This  collapse will not be 
followed by the rise of the national states to take its place; 
the states will instead remain unable to face the political 
challenges of the globalized world. He envisions a kind of 
“neomedieval” scenario, characterized by the fragmentation 
of actors, allegiances, jurisdictions and administrative 
competences. “The weakening of the EU will not reinforce 
the national States. On the contrary, it will have the opposite 
effect. The EU has helped the Member States to generate 
economic growth through a single market and projects to 
bring in new members, and it has provided an easy excuse for 
many political failures. With a  weakened EU, the Member 
States will reinforce other political actors, like cities, regions 
and non-governmental organizations.”
4
 Zielonka’s diagnosis 
does not auger catastrophe, but it invites us to reflect upon 
the possible scenarios that could follow EU dissolution: “in 
recent years, the EU has exercised its integrative functions 
poorly. Now it seems incapable of reforming itself. There 
will come a moment in which an integration animated by 
autonomous functional networks, without a strong European 
center, will be seen as the most appropriate one to pursue. 
The European Union may be condemned to disappear, but 
Europe and European integration are not.”
5
Zielonka’s diagnosis provides an original reformulation 
of the theory of functional spillovers. The classical theories 
have laid the ground for political action aimed first at the 
integration of the sectors of a common market, then monetary 
union, the Schengen Treaty and the crowning glory of a 
constitutional upgrade. Zielonka observes instead how the 
current crisis of one sector, the financial one, has called into 
question the free movement of persons, and is casting doubt 
4 Ibidem, XIII.
5 Ibidem, XV.
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on both monetary and political union: “it seems that the 
winds of interdependence have changed: interdependence 
no longer generates integration. One observes a process of 
progressive involution, more than positive relapse, in the 
sense that the disintegration in one sector provokes the 
disintegration in another.”6 From this point of view, the end 
of the European Union could look more like a gradual process 
of closing up shop, rather than sudden collapse. Zielonka 
imagines the near future as “neomedieval,”7 mosaic-  like or 
polyphonic, in which multiple actors integrate according to 
vital functional criteria in global cities, which stand alongside 
traditional, but politically downsized, national states.
Zielonka’s analysis, original and persuasive, leaves 
open three basic questions. First, his argument that the 
disintegration of the European Union would be a reaction 
to the crisis of the paradigm of territorial integration 
caused by the national States, and would be curable only 
with  increasing  doses  of  functional integration,
8 seems 
vulnerable  as  a  matter  of genealogy: the European crisis 
can be interpreted on the contrary as the failure of the 
functionalist and confederal paradigm, and perhaps could 
be remedied by greater territorial, democratic and federal 
integration, carried out by non-national, sub-national, or 
trans- national political actors.9 Furthermore, the vision of 
6 Ibidem, 46.
7 From this point of view Zielonka’s analysis follows the description of Saskia 
Sassen of the political role of European cities in building the Westphalian 
system. Cfr. S. Sassen, Territory, Autonomy, Rights, Princeton, 2006, p. 73: 
“I posit that cities and intercity mobilities constituted a larger networked 
territorial formation, one arising form the ground up, which eventually 
functioned as a built-in capability for the emergent territorialities of national 
states.”
8 Ibidem, pp. 91-92.
9 German sociologist Claus Offe observed that “in sociological terms it could 
be said that the scope of functional integration is much wider than that 
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global cities as new centers of political power in the post-
disintegration scenario leaves open the question of the 
specificity of European cities with respect to other global 
cities: if what counts are only flows of finance, research, 
technological innovation and a qualified labor force, then 
why should Rome, Paris, Berlin, London or Madrid be any 
more important than New York, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo or 
Shanghai? The models of global cities developed thus far 
oscillate between the modernist megalopolis that Gottman 
saw in the urban-suburban continuum along the East Coast 
of the United States
10 and the metropolises of southern China 
(the province of Hong Kong-Guandong) characterized by 
an internal spatial discontinuity, with rural and industrial 
areas, and underdeveloped urban spaces11 In the face of 
these two models, the European cities have entered the 
information age having inherited very different spatial 
structures; the suburban space is socially diversified, 
segmented into peripheries orbiting around a clear center. 
The European urban tradition reflects a different kind of 
constitutional sociality from that of both American and Asian 
megalopolises.
In the end, the networked cities theory overlooks the 
problems of dimension and of the new social exclusions 
that would be created; what would be the destiny of small 
and medium- sized cities, of the towns that give life to so 
of social integration; we are passively affected from something that goes 
beyond our capacity for collective action. Europe is perceived (at best) by 
its citizens as a community of destiny, but not as a control on one’s own 
destiny”, in C.Offe, L’Europa in trappola, Bologna, 2014, p.65.
10 J. Gottmann, Megalopolis, New York, 1961.
11 M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, Malden, 2000, p. 439: “the 
Southern China metropolis, only vaguely perceived in most of the world 
at this time, is likely to become the most representative urban face of the 
twenty- first century”.
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much of the European territory? Will the new functional, 
digital and communicative networks be able to hold 
together populations that continue to live in marginal places, 
according to analogous codes as the urban dwellers? Will 
the new networked European Empire be able to govern the 
provinces?
IV. The crisis of the statist paradigm and the re-
turn of the municipalist federalizing process
Both the process of European integration as we have 
known it, and the unfolding process of its dissolution, have 
been the focus of conflicting analyses. According to the leading 
account, the creation of the supranational organization   has 
progressively   eroded the sovereignty of its Member States. 
The crisis of the EU ought therefore to trigger a return to 
a Westphalian situation, in which the national states can 
reconquer their lost territory. In fact, Eurosceptics on both the 
right and the left have told this story of the rise and fall of the 
European Empire. Another story celebrates the contribution 
of European integration (material, economic, geopolitical 
and of an international nature) to the reconstruction of the 
European States vanquished in the Second World War. It 
traces the roots of the current crisis back to 1989, when two of 
the basic premises upon which the European Union was built 
– the German question and the Soviet threat – disappeared. 
If we look at the process of European integration through 
the lens of methodological nationalism, we can see that the 
Euro was conceived as a check upon the German Mark, and 
that France derailed political unification (from its rejection 
of the European Defense Community in 1954 to its rejection 
of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005). However, with the rise 
of an aggressive Russia, and with Germany in a position 
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of reluctant hegemony, we might exit the current crisis by 
abandoning methodological nationalism and observing that 
“the world has become cosmopolitan not by choice but rather 
by condition.”
12
This alternative interpretation opens the door to a 
more constructive vision of the outcome of a process of EU 
disintegration, in which the national States do not regain the 
absolute, internal sovereignty that they (might have) had in 
the nineteenth century.
13 Instead, the main loci of power will 
be found in the webs of global cities, functional associations 
and along the paths of a dematerialized communication, 
typical of the twenty-first century.
From the constitutional point of view, the cultural 
foundations of the Metropolis scenario spring from 
the European federalist tradition, and from the Italian 
municipalist tradition in particular: the great Italian federalists 
Cattaneo
14 and Salvemini15 describe a network of federated 
cities, which existed prior to national integration in Italy 
and was able to resist both national and regional centralism. 
From the standpoint of a general theory of federalism, this is 
a vision of a new, social, cybernetic federalism,
16 particularly 
suited to describe the development of a communicative and 
political web, centerless and procedural.
17 It is not a matter 
12 U. Beck, La Crisi dell’Europa, Bologna, 2012, p.13.
13 J. Zielonka, op.cit., p.58: “sovereignty is a notion that has meaning only 
when the legal-political boundaries of a state coincide with the edges of its 
commercial outlets, its military borders and its migration characteristics. 
And this is no longer the case ‘”.
14 C. Cattaneo, La città considerata come principio ideale, in Una Teoria della 
Libertà, Torino, 2011,p. 169.
15 G. Salvemini, Movimento socialista e questione meridionale, a cura di G. 
Arfé. Milano, 1963, pp.628-34.
16 Cfr. D. Elazar, Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa, 1987. It. Tr.: Idee e forme 
del federalismo, Milano, 1998, p.189.
17 C. Friedrich, L’uomo, la comunità, l’ordine politico, Bologna 2002, p.291.
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of revitalizing the statist federalism of a United States of 
Europe, nor the intergovernmental confederalism that has 
been dominant up until now: both of these visions have fed 
off the methodological nationalism that has distorted both 
the diagnosis and the search for possible federal cure for the 
failure of functionalism.
18
The European Sonderweg denotes both the peculiar 
institutional framework which is neither federal nor 
confederal and the particular normative framework by which 
the supremacy of European law over national law does not 
correspond to a supremacy of the powers of European Union 
institutions over national ones.
The first aspect of the EU’s peculiarity recalls the never 
ending dispute of the proper legal classification of this sui 
generis international organization. Insisting on the federation/
confederation dichotomy means remaining inside positivistic 
formalism that favors rules over processes and aims at 
identifying the ‘place’ of sovereignty, the first  category to 
have been questioned by Europeanization and globalization 
of constitutional law. As a matter of fact, the distinction 
between federation and confederation was historically built 
by legal theorists elaborating the implications of the shift 
from the Articles of Confederation of 1777 to the US Federal 
Constitution of 1787, and the process of establishment of the 
German Reich in 1871. Consequently, the distinction between 
18 Cfr. U. Beck, La Crisi dell’Europa, Bologna, 2012, p.11. “a national vision 
encompasses two and only two interpretations of contemporary European 
politics and integration: federalism, leading to a federal super-state,  or 
intergovernmentalism, leading to a confederation of states. Both models 
are empirically inadequate, because they fail to grasp neither contemporary 
Europe nor the nations that compose it”. V. anche J. Habermas, Nella spirale 
tecnocratica, Bari, 2014, p.24: “ there is no need to understand this jump in 
supranational democracy as a transition to the ‘United States of Europe’. 
Confederation of Independent States, or European federal state is a false 
alternative (a legacy of nineteenth century German state law)”.
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federation and confederation corresponded to the distinction 
between Constitution and Treaty and, symmetrically, 
between national and international plane. According to 
the traditional approach (positivistic and dominant) the 
federal constitution is a national act that confers sovereign 
powers only to the federation, amendable by a qualified 
majority of member states, while the confederation is a 
treaty under international law that leaves untouched the 
constituent units’ sovereign prerogatives, which can only 
be changed respecting the unanimity principle. Now, 
using conceptual categories of state institutions of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century in order  to describe a 
twenty-first century confederation of national constitutions 
means to compare very different institutional settings, with 
incommensurable powers, existing in extremely different 
historical and economic circumstances.
The second aspect of the European’s Sonderweg, on 
the other hand, points toward a post-democratic executive 
federalism. In my opinion, it cannot work in the long 
term, because it erodes the very democratic substrate 
from which executive power needs to draw its political 
legitimacy. National systems of executive federalism, such as 
Germany’s, always rest upon a foundation of constitutional 
federalism, which gives the Federation the power to 
amend the constitution. In Germany, federal law prevails 
over state (Länder) law, and federal law is implemented 
by the state governments, but Federal bodies may amend 
the  constitution. In the EU, by contrast, the supremacy of 
community law over national law, and the principle by 
which national governments implement community law, 
are not  accompanied by the power of EU bodies to amend 
the treaties. The Member States remain the “Masters of the 
Treaties,” and even need to reach unanimity (which can take 
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from five to ten years) in order to amend them.
This asymmetric federalism, legal and administrative 
on the one hand, but not political and constitutional on 
the other, illustrates the impasse at which we find the EU 
institutions today.19 If, as Friedrich20 tells us, federalism 
and constitutionalism are inseparable processes of social 
transformation, the European constitutional crisis is also a 
crisis of its federalist aspirations. It is only by reanimating 
these federalist aspirations that we might address the 
constitutional crisis. As it has been wisely observed 
“European federalism ought not therefore represent the 
conquest of sovereignty by a ‘European people,’ but a new 
form of political union, horizontal, pluralist and based on 
the deliberation among citizens who share this innovative 
project tethered to a web of fundamental protections, both 
individual and collective. We thus call for an understanding 
of federalism as a process for the distribution of powers 
between the different levels of government, in which citizens 
exercise a reciprocal democratic check, underwriting common 
agreements that do not sacrifice their basic differences, but 
are instead the motor of an integration achieved through 
diversity.”
21
The paradox of the statist paradigm of European 
federalism is that the more we need  it, the more it becomes 
impracticable. The actors that ought to initiate a federalizing 
process for the constitution of a United States of Europe 
are the very national states that get in its way. One recalls 
19 V. R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism, Oxford, 2010, 69; 
European Constitutional Law, Cambridge, 2012, 47. Cfr. A. Vespaziani, 
“L’Unione Europea: Federazione o Confederazione?”, in PrimaFacie, vol.3, 
n.25, 2014, http://periodicos.ufpb.br/ojs2/index.php/primafacie/article/
view/26754/14259
20 C. Friedrich, L’uomo, la comunità, l’ordine politico, Bologna 2002, p. 309.
21 G. Allegri e G. Bronzini, Sogno europeo o incubo?, Roma, 2014, pp.126-127.
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Einstein’s famous adage, that we cannot solve a problem 
by using the same mentality that created it in the first place. 
The passage from a statist mentality to a municipalist one 
could allow European federalism to avoid both the Titanic 
scenario and the Apocalypse Now. It could enable us to move 
towards a social integration on the European scale, powered 
by European Metropolis(es).
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